Sunday, January 31, 2010

Constructing the Identity of a Witch: Feminism and Self-Defining Religions in Twentieth Century Witchcraft Historiography*

*I wrote this article in mid-December of last year, and I'm just not getting around to posting it. It's sort of an overarching view of what I learned in much of witchcraft class, specifically the relationship of gender, feminism, and New Age religious belief on witchcraft historiography and the popular perception of witchcraft among lay audiences. Little did I know that this article would be published on slate.com a mere three days after I completed this article. If you have neither the time nor inclination to read it, it may be summarized, briefly, as an article designed to debunk many of the "demonstrably false historical claims" made by Wiccans, Neopagan, and other New Agers, who have based their growing new faith on a hodgepodge of ancient and medieval myths. Mark Oppenheimer's piece defines religion as a "madman's fantasy" that has simply failed to die out, though he castigates Wiccans in particular for their penchant for making a historical fact out of apocryphal mythology. Oppenheimer cites numerous examples of Wiccan tenets that can simply be proven wrong, and he warns that adherents to religions that rest on shaky foundations face a difficult battle to justify and validate their beliefs. For the most part, I agree with everything Oppenheimer writes, yet we come to two very different conclusions. While Oppenheimer sees a danger for Wiccans in continuing to believe easily falsifiable claims, I find this to be among the most important ingredients in most religions. As Rebecca Collins writes in "Concealing the Poverty of Traditional Historiography: Myth as Mystification in Historical Discourse", "myth and history are typically construed as antitherical approaches to the past" but goes on to say that all histories "contain some element of myth" and that the embracing of these myths "reinforces the shared values" of a culture. Myth-making bonds those who ascribe to its deeper meaning, regardless of its historicity. Oppenheimer writes that "it's one thing to have faith in things unseen; that's human. It's a whole other thing to have faith in an easily disproved historical conceit." True, but aren't all major religions engaging in exactly that? Most religions that rely on texts (essentially all major modern-day religions that are not animist) seem to have at least some basis in a history that has been molded to suit their spiritual needs. Wicca is no different, except that it has the perceived misfortune of emerging at a time when many of its historical claims can be refuted. Essentially, the argument I've made here is that, so long as Wiccans don't co-opt the historical reality and replace it with their own mythology, there seems to be no harm in believing something that is "demonstrably false"--as I said, I feel this is what all people of all religious traditions end up doing to some extent anyway. As with most posts of research papers and essays, I have removed many of the citations, though I have attempted to give credit for direct quotations. This was not originally meant as a research paper but a reflective essay, so I have not directly quoted very often.

It is impossible to discuss the history of witchcraft without addressing the question of gender. In many ways, however, it is even more difficult to assess the role of gender in the historiography of witchcraft studies because successive generations of scholars, feminist writers, and Neopagans have assigned importance to it based on diverse philosophical, political, and personal reasons. The twentieth century has witnessed a reinterpretation of the meaning of witchcraft as each of these groups have endeavored to assimilate the “idea” of witchcraft either to suit their own purposes or correspond to their preconceived notions of the past. Some feminist writers and philosophers have recast the witch craze of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a “holocaust of women” and inseparable from modern domestic violence, spousal abuse, and misogyny (Purkiss 17). Others have declared that the persecution of witches should be retroactively regarded as a historical facet of the modern legacy of violence towards women and historically treated as such. Likewise, many modern Wiccans and Neopagans regard the witch hunts with reverence, esteem as martyrs those who were executed, and redefine the past in mythic dimensions. This modern-day reclamation of the past allows followers of the burgeoning New Age religious traditions to imbue their beliefs with deeper narrative hermeneutics and interpret past persecutions with symbolic, spiritual meaning. Of course, many scholars have taken issue with these cavalier revisionisms. For example, Diane Purkiss criticizes these self-serving affirmations as a disingenuous form of narratology. She blames not only radicals and New Agers for this historical apostasy, but also careless academic historians of the early and mid-twentieth century for their failure to assess witchcraft by the standards of its practitioners. Without these academic reassessments, the feminist and Wiccan revisions would likely have taken very different forms. In all of these varied definitions, gender looms large. By examining the evolving notions of gender in the turbulent era of twentieth century witchcraft historiography, we can better appreciate these politically and philosophically charged reinterpretations of the past.

Twentieth century witchcraft historiography traditionally begins with Egyptologist Margaret Murray. Murray’s thesis, enunciated in The Witch-cult in Western Europe (1921), argued for the enduring existence of a pre-modern fertility cult that was overshadowed by the façade of Christianity during the Middle Ages. This faith, predating all of the major world religions, hearkened back to the worship of a mother goddess, became conflated with the Dianic cult, and persisted into the Middle Ages until a concerted campaign by Church authorities attempted to eradicate it. Despite her difficulty in “grasp[ing] the historical method” and her “highly selective” use of sources, Murray’s appraisal of the subject became authoritative for nearly fifty years (Purkiss 62).

The first serious attempt to call her views into question appeared in the 1970s. Norman Cohn and Richard Kieckhefer challenged the notion that a cult existed underground and outside the mainstream of established social structure. Kieckhefer demarcated a specific chronology of witchcraft persecutions and noted the incorporation of diabolism, the pact with the devil, and heresy in the elite conception of the crime of witchcraft. Cohn recognized that events in antiquity and the Middle Ages, at least in part, provided a template for later witch hunters in their persecution of witches. Just as the Romans had accused the early Christians of cannibalism and infanticide and the medieval Church had accused the Waldensians and Cathars of devil-worship, so too did the elite authorities of the early modern era accuse women of witchcraft. While Cohn and Kieckhefer utilized the historical record more effectively than Murray, their results yielded accurate information about only one component of the story. Cohn’s treatment of the high-level, theological legal discourses employed among the clergy failed to accurately represent the beliefs and practices of the persecuted women themselves. Though Cohn’s discussion of the upper class impressions of witchcraft marked a vast improvement over Murray, women were reduced to mere scapegoats and victims without a voice of their own. Gender was addressed, insofar as Cohn acknowledged that women comprised the majority of the accused, but it did not become a concentrated topic of study until the next generation of scholars.

As Cohn tacitly admitted in this exemption, the dialogue between elite and peasant varieties of witchcraft had little in common, but one familiar factor for both was the expectation that most witches were women. Modern historical research into gender in the early modern era has prompted a reevaluation of its significance in the witch hunts. In what ways did gender affect witchcraft? In the terminology of Christina Larner, the early modern crime of witchcraft was “sex-related” but not “sex-specific” because femaleness was not necessarily a requisite for witchcraft. However, early modern persecutors and prosecutors clearly conceived of the crime as archetypically female. In he article “Who Were the Witches?” Larner contends that witch-hunting was woman-hunting specifically when women deviated from the societal norms delineated by masculine authorities, and prosecutors were armed with a deep tradition of medical knowledge, religious doctrine, and culturally inculcated expectations to denigrate women. Authorities who persecuted witches deferred to the Bible in order to bolster their claims that women constituted the weaker sex. As daughters of Eve, masculine elites believed women were prone to temptation, lascivious in nature, and more easily deceived by the devil. The Bible contained direct passages referring to the power of witchcraft. One regularly quoted text details the account of the witch of Endor. The Israelite king Saul visited this necromancer to summon the ghost of the prophet Samuel in order to divine his future. Samuel admonished Saul for defying God’s will, and Saul, despondent and fearful, ultimately committed suicide (1 Samuel 28:3-25). Even more frequently quoted was the simple command from Exodus that “Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live” (Exodus 22:18). Clearly, the Bible warned the elite prosecutors of the dangers of the crime of witchcraft, and these prosecutors increasingly equated it with women.

The greatest impact on the archetypal image of the female witch derived from the Malleus Maleficarum. This work was the most influential of the so-called witch hunting manuals and it corroborated scriptural conceptions of this increasingly female crime. First published in 1486 by the German Dominican professor of theology, Heinrich Kramer, the Malleus promulgated, for the first time, a codified definition of witchcraft for the elites. This work sought to defend the existence of witchcraft from its critics, describe the activities of witches, and explain why the greater preponderance of witches was to be found among women rather than men. The Malleus asserted that women were “chiefly addicted to evil superstitions” because the devil more easily “corrupts their faith,” and affirmed that “their slippery tongues are unable to conceal from their fellow-women those things which by evil arts they know." For the clergy, witchcraft came to encompass heresy, and it constituted the most heinous variety, since it involved a rejection of God and a compact with the devil. Deferring to St. Augustine, Kramer argued that “the abomination of witchcraft arose from this foul connection of mankind with the devil,” and this interweaving of diabolism with the idea of the witch signified the dire consequences of the crime. The Malleus also drew from more sources than simply Biblical and patristic—the Western classical heritage of Cicero, Seneca, and Aristotle substantiated these negative stereotypes of women as witches. The potent combination of scriptural authority and classical precedent entrenched the idea of female weakness in the minds of the elite clergy. The Malleus also discussed the crime of maleficium, or harmful magic, which became increasingly intertwined with the particularly female crime of witchcraft. By the early sixteenth century, the typical witch had emerged as a woman, usually lower class, and often devoid of any male figures in her life. Historiographically, the impact of the Malleus often denotes a point of divergence among more traditional male historians who view the Malleus as one among many important early modern primary witchcraft sources, and feminists who accentuate its preeminence among lesser works (Purkiss 11).

Modern witchcraft scholarship has emphasized the role of gender in the witch hunts through simple statistical analysis of the historical sources. While precise numbers are difficult to ascertain, almost all trial records demonstrate that a majority of those prosecuted and executed were female. According to Darren Oldridge, the average number female witches across Europe and North America between 1560 and 1660 amounted to roughly seventy-five percent (WR 8). Both H.C. Erik Middlefort and Christina Larner claim a higher percentage at eighty percent for Europe as a whole, and Middlefort remarks further that perhaps as many as ninety percent of witches were women for lands under German control during the height of the witch hunts. The numbers for North America are similar. According to Richard Godbeer, up to seventy-nine percent of all witches and eighty-four percent of demoniacs were female (Godbeer 68 and 114). Obviously, at the very least, the statistical evidence demonstrates a correlation between witch-hunting and women-hunting.

Numbers, however, can be skewed to stress a particular ideological message or to affirm a particular identity contingent upon these quantitative extremes. While the ratios of men to women in the early modern witch hunts have been well established, the raw numbers themselves have not. Purkiss quotes feminist writer Mary Daly, whose drastic inflation of numbers in Gyn/Ecology expresses her desire to compete with more notable massacres in the past. Daly cites the witch craze as an event that decimated “millions of women” in early modern Europe and America, and Purkiss criticizes her for quoting these number as if they represented a mark of distinction in feminist history (Purkiss 13 and 17). Similarly, Wiccan spiritual leader Starhawk, in her original publication of The Spiral Dance, estimated the number of women executed at nine million, or nearly one hundred times higher than even most liberal of scholarly estimates (Starhawk 208). In a later edit, Starhawk revised this figure to “a low of one hundred thousand” while still allowing for the upper range. She qualified the original approximation as “probably high” and averred that “nobody knows exactly how many people died in the persecutions” (Starhawk 208). This augmentation, whether purposefully misleading or not, indicates a desire on the part of both feminist writers and Wiccan spiritual figures to sympathize with and find personal meaning in the tragic historical event. Unfortunately, their embellishment of these quantities diminishes the seriousness one can afford them, and it situates these revisionist authors in the awkward position of consciously striving to surpass more recent and well-documented violence. Purkiss has criticized both radical feminists and Wiccans for attempting to cast the murky events of the past as a “holocaust of [their] own” and for directly opposing the more “paradigmatic atrocity” of the Holocaust of 1942-1945 (Purkiss 6 and 17).

The rhetoric employed by early modern persecutors and prosecutors of witches and the sheer numerical data available certainly lends credence to the thesis that witch hunting is “sex-specific,” but as E.J. Kent argues, the evidence for the prosecution of males for similar crimes indicates that “sex-related” is a more accurate descriptor. Though maleficium remained a particularly female offense, men were often accused in England and New England of harmful practical magic in the economic sphere. Just as women faced accusations over property damage to household items, livestock, or crops—items related to domesticity and fertility—men skirmished “over rights to land and resources.” Males accused of witchcraft generally encountered allegations from other males who regarded their activities as misrepresenting normative masculinity. For example, John Godfrey of colonial Massachusetts met opposition to his peripatetic lifestyle because it failed to conform to the standards of late seventeenth century colonial behavior for males. What may appear to modern sensibilities as the prototypical masculine male—unmarried, unsettled, and without a family—appeared to colonial observers as a “poor practi[tioner] of patriarchy” and this “cut across the paradigmatic idealization of masculine virtue.” The existence of male witches, even if their numbers were small compared to women, confirms Larner’s explanation of witchcraft as “sex-related” rather than “sex-specific.”

How have modern feminists, wiccans, and Neopagans come to understand gender given the reinterpretations it has undergone among academic historians? Purkiss stresses that each group has used the concept of the witch to “construct [an] identity” conforming to the features of its past most relevant to the individual exegete. Historians themselves are not immune to this criticism, and Purkiss performs a postmodern deconstruction of many of their arguments, especially those arguments that appear entirely unaware of their own biases and shortcomings. For example, Purkiss is severely critical of the “Enlightenment” bias that characterizes a substantial amount of early witchcraft historiography. These historians not only ignored the importance of gender in defining witchcraft but also gave prominence to the rise of skepticism and the decline superstition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While important, this aspect of witchcraft continues to focus too narrowly on the resolution of the “problem” of witchcraft while obscuring the actual participants in the trials (Purkiss 59-60). In a way, Murray can be read as a reaction against this form of Whiggish historiography. The emphasis on the progress of science and reason over superstition and irrationality constituted one of the many important chapters in this school of history. By positing a timeless, unbroken link with a religion from the ancient past, Murray essentially denied the progress of religion from “primitive” to more advanced forms—the fertility cult of the pre-modern era was only subsumed by Christianity rather than replaced by it.

Paradoxically, though Murray’s theory has been soundly rejected by modern scholars, at least one historian has erected a theoretical framework similar to Murray’s but on a much smaller scale (Purkiss 44 and 61). Carlo Ginzburg’s focus on the peasant classes and folk religious beliefs of the Friulian region of northern Italy implies a similar undercurrent of popular folk beliefs largely ignored by centuries of elites. However, these peasant attitudes are vitally important for understanding the local culture of the region. Following the political and religious restructurings of the Counter-Reformation, the clergy—and with it the Inquisition—took a much keener interest in the beliefs and practices of the lay peasantry. In the case of the benandanti—an actual agricultural fertility cult in Friuli, Italy—Ginzburg stresses that it was the elite process of integrating contemporary peasant practices with preconceived notions of the witch cult and sabbat that created the specific classification of witchcraft. The benandanti believed that their spirits rose out of their bodies at night and traveled to do combat with witches and demons in what they referred to as “night battles.” It would take the Inquisition to conflate the benandanti’s own concept of a “night battle” with that of the witch’s sabbat and thus equate them with the very evil they believed they were exterminating. Unlike Murray, Ginzburg discovered a popular religion that likely existed in concert with Christianity. Rather than two completely divorced spiritualities, these folk beliefs fused with peasant interpretations of Christianity to create a distinct regional, religious culture. In some ways, twentieth century faiths that rely on both ancient and modern precedents are undergoing the same types of acculturation.

Neopagans and Wiccans have co-opted this strategy for their own religious purposes. As self-defining associations, these groups have essentially utilized the historical record as their scripture. Religions almost always must interpret their histories symbolically in order to approach their deepest meanings. Purkiss discusses the psychoanalytic trend among historians who study the supernatural, but it seems even more applicable to the discourse that Neopagans and Wiccans employ to express their extremely varied belief systems (Purkis 77). Neopaganism draws on myriad historical traditions in a conscious attempt to revive, in modern form, the pre-Christian and non-Christian religions of now extinct ancient cultures—Celtic, Nordic, Egyptian, Native American, and so on. The “disorganized” appearance of this fluid set of beliefs does not imply that it is not a legitimate faith. Rather, this appeal to cultures disparate in time and place indicates not only the ease with which new traditions may be assimilated but also that those who adhere to these new (and old) faiths tend to be suspicious of organized religion in the first place (Purkiss 31-32).

The question remains: to what degree can one alter the past to gratify one’s own spiritual needs? At what point in comprehensive reinterpretation does logos become mythos, dissociated entirely from the historical record from which it draws? Purkiss criticizes these approaches when the alteration of the historical record to suit the symbolic needs of the religion becomes so extreme that it confounds all coherent meaning. For example, Purkiss chides those Wiccans, such as Zsuzsanna Budapest, who contend that their religion draws from a spiritual well that extends back in time to an ancient matriarchal society where women ruled fairly and effectively, coexisted peacefully with nature, did not go to war, and emphasized beauty over cruelty (Purkiss 41). This myth materialized out of the discoveries at the Minoan palace of Knossos on Crete by Arthur Evans, and despite the lack of conclusive evidence for a gender-equal, nonviolent society, many modern Wiccans attest to this past as factual in order to legitimize their own beliefs when coaxed by others (Purkiss 41). Is this selective scholarship akin to Murray’s? Or, is this the kernel for a new, modern-day mythology?

This process of self-definition remains ongoing at all times—from the benandanti, caught between Friulian folk beliefs and a lay peasant version of Christianity in sixteenth century Italy, to Wiccans and Neopagans, many of whom must rebuff allegations of Satan worship and child abuse. Perhaps the most successful example of this type of self-definition in action is Starhawk’s appropriation of witchcraft to describe the goddess religion she and her cohorts practice. From a historical perspective, Starhawk’s Spiral Dance is rife with errors. For example, Starhawk states that “the rising male medical establishment welcomed the chance to stamp out midwives and village herbalists, their major economic competitors” (Starhawk 208). However, most historians today recognize that very few midwives were ever persecuted for witchcraft, and these historians have, in a sense, dismantled that myth (Purkiss 21 and WR 59, 258). In this case, myth carries the negative connotations of a mistakenly-held conviction. For Starhawk, it denotes a literature signifying a deeper truth. She readily acknowledges that “witchcraft has always been a religion of poetry, not theology. The myths, legends, and teachings are recognized as metaphors for that That-Which-Cannot-Be-Told” (Starhawk 210). By approaching Starhawk’s works as primary sources of a new religious tradition rather than as misinterpreted historical secondary sources, her assertions cease to be erroneous history and become the mythology of a goddess religion.

Christina Larner posed the question, “was witch-hunting women hunting?” and answered with the now famous hypothesis that it was “sex-related” but not “sex-specific.” Gender was a causal factor as evidenced by the fact that women made up the overwhelming majority of witches, but it was not necessarily the direct cause because the accused were persecuted for being witches, not women. The considerable amount of evidence demonstrating correlation proves that gender was a defining factor in the persecution and prosecution of witchcraft. But this is a historical question, and, as we have seen, not all those interested in witchcraft are specifically interested in the same types of historical evidence. Early witchcraft historians largely overlooked gender in favor of rational and empirical explanations for it decline, while Margaret Murray’s interest in gender corresponded to her belief in the existence of ancient fertility cults. Many radical feminists have so singularly focused on gender that they render the greater dynamic historical mechanisms at work during the witch hunts unintelligible and unimportant. Neopagans and Wiccans have incorporated the notion of gender into their mythology and are in the long, syncretic process of building a religion. Provided that we do not read the admittedly unhistorical as history, these diverse interpretations of gender in the canon of witchcraft studies, literature, and scripture may thrive together.


Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Books I Read in 2009


For the first time ever, here is a yearly book list. I've been meaning to start doing this for years, but instead of keeping track of the books I do read, I end up keeping track of books that I intend to read. I compiled this while I was bored at the office today and should have been working on either editing a paper I'm presenting next month or, ironically, doing some reading. As far as I can remember, this is every book I read in 2009. This list includes books I did not finish, provided that I read over half of them, but does not include the many books out of which I read a chapter or two. The latter was mostly via reading assignments from classes or books I used for research. After looking at them all together, I did notice a few things I did not expect. Firstly, there are more women writers on this list than I anticipated. A little over a quarter of the books I read last year were penned by females. While perusing my own bookshelves, I'm often struck by the embarrassing dearth of quality women writers represented in my collection. I don't think I'm sexist; it's just that somehow more of the books I read happen to be written by men. One reason this was probably different this year is because women are rather healthily represented in history, especially social and cultural history written since the 1970s. Secondly, I read more non-history than I expected as well. A little over a quarter of the books I read last year were non-history, and among those, nearly half were fiction. I read much less fiction than I once did, but it's nice to see it represented if only a little. And it was reasonably diverse fiction as well, ranging from science fiction to historical fiction to literary fiction to Gothic to thriller to, er... gross, sexual coming of age tale? These are roughly listed in the order in which I read them. So, here's the list:

+ = books that I did not read in their entirety but read enough of (i.e. over 50%) that inclusion is merited
* = books that I had read before but reread this year
bold = books that I especially recommend reading
@!%& = books that I especially recommend avoiding at all costs

The Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington
The Gnostic Gospels by Elaine Pagels
Reading Judas: The Gospel of Judas and the Shaping of Christianity by Elaine Pagels and Karen King
Frankenstein by Mary Shelly*
Astrology by Zohar @!%&
The Fated Sky: Astrology in History by Benson Bobrick
A History of Western Astrology by Jim Tester
The Gnostic Jung and the Seven Sermons of the Dead ed. by Robert Segal
The Holy Grail by Norma Lorre Goodrich + @!%&
A History of the World in 10 1/2 Chapters by Julian Barnes
Dreams, Memories, Reflections by Carl Jung
Medieval Thought by Gordon Leff
The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe by Valerie Flint * +
Science and Creation by John Polkinghorne
Freedom of Choice Affirmed by Corliss Lamont
The Holographic Universe by Michael Talbot
Rock of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life by Stephen Jay Gould
Religion and Science: Contemporary and Historical Issues by Ian G. Barbour
Psychology and Alchemy by Carl Jung +
Wetlands by Charlotte Roche
The Language Instinct by Stephen Pinker
How the Mind Works by Stephen Pinker +
Anathem by Neal Stephenson
The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins
Angels and Demons by Dan Brown
Morandi's Last Prophecy by Brendan Dooley +
The Making of the West, Volume 1 by Lynn Hunt et. al.
Universe of Stone: A Biography of Chartres Cathedral by Philip Ball
The Fires of Vesuvius: Pompeii Lost and Found by Mary Beard
Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City State by Mogens Herman Hansen
The Histories by Herodotus +*
The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides +*
A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom by Andrew Dickson White +
Andrew Dickson White: Educator, Historian, Diplomat by Glenn C. Altschuler
Giordano Bruno: Philosopher/Heretic by Ingrid Rowland
Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition by Frances Yates
The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth Century Miller by Carlo Ginzburg
The Devil's Dominion: Magic and Religion in Early New England by Richard Godbeer
The Devil in the Shape of a Woman by Carol Karlsen*
The Witchcraft Reader ed. by Darren Oldridge
The Witchcraft Sourcebook ed. by Brian Levack
Witches of the Atlantic World ed. by Elaine Breslaw
The Witch in History by Diane Purkiss
Europe's Inner Demons by Norman Cohn*
The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists Are Murdering Our Past by Keith Windschuttle +
Not By Fact Alone: Historical Essays on the Reading and Writing of History by John Clive +
Faces of History: From Herodotus to Herder by Donald Kelley
Modern Historiography: An Introduction by Michael Bentley
Confession by Guibert de Nogent*+
Feudal Society: The Growth of Ties of Dependence by Marc Bloch +
The Historian's Craft by Marc Bloch +
Dark Fire by C.J. Sansom
The History of the English Church and People by the Venerable Bede +*
The History of the Franks by Gregory of Tours +
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire by Edward Gibbon+*
The Old Regime and the French Revolution by Alexis de Tocqueville+
Domenico Scandella, Known as Menocchio: His Trial before the Inquisition, 1583-1599 by Andrea del Col
Beer and Philosophy ed. Stephen Hales

Tuesday, January 12, 2010

Genesis Revisited


A year ago this week, I started the blog "Conversations with Philemon". It began, at least in part, as a New Year's Resolution designed to get me writing more since I had noticed a sharp decline in the amount of writing I had been doing from the end of college to the present. In that capacity, it has succeeded marvelously. I haven't counted but I think I've probably written somewhere in the vicinity of 75,000 words over the course of the year. The 52 posts from 2009 didn't quite reach the 100-post goal that I intended, but I'm neither disappointed nor am I surprised. The exigencies of life often get in the way of the things we'd like to do. This blog has also been an exercise in the theory that people do their best (and most) work amidst the busy-ness of daily life. I posted less in my off-time over the summer and winter break than I did in the comparatively hectic spring--during which I was working overtime, preparing to move out of Michigan, and getting everything together to start graduate school--and fall, which was my first semester of graduate school. To be fair, not everything I wrote was original material. In fact, close to 1/3 of the total posts, and probably a rather higher percentage of total words, were previous writings that I edited for posting. Most of these, of course, were history papers of some sort, but since this blog is at least partially devoted to history, I think this was an acceptable modus operandi.

Has this process taught me anything? I'm sure it has, but I'm not entirely sure what that is yet. Do I write more now than I did a year ago? Most definitely. But has this blog gotten me into the habit of sitting down to pound out my thoughts in written form? Maybe. The necessities of graduate school and of my future academic career have assured that I'll never be in want of writing anymore. Right now, that has turned into great fodder for some extensive blog posts, but I have a feeling that as the years roll on, should I keep up with this blog, it may very well turn into a more personal journal. Or, conversely, it may become a place only for posts of my papers and research. Frankly, I'm hoping to avoid both. The diversity of this blog has been one of my favorite aspects, and although my interests obviously gravitate toward history, I enjoy that looking back on my posts, I've written on topics ranging from particle physics to probability theory to socialism to poetry to synchronicity. If I have anything like a new goal for this blog for the coming year, I'd say it would be something like "introduce even greater diversity into my topics." I think, on occasion, I'd also like to be able to post shorter works too. One of the reasons I think I only made it to 52 posts is that I spent the better part of a week working on some of them. Another goal may be something along the lines of "it's OK to write twice as many posts that are half as long." Not really my style, but it might break up the monotony of some of these posts (even I find the contents dull sometimes).

It's hard not to look back on the year of blogging and think about the year in general. It's difficult for me to think of another year in my life that was as eventful as 2009. I moved twice, lived in three states, worked in (not the same) three states, witnessed the inauguration of America's first black president, applied to, was accepted to, and began graduate school, visited New York City for the first time, rediscovered my love of hiking, and read more than I think I've read in any single year of my life. Despite some minor economic hardships in those last months in Michigan, it was a pretty good year. It's also hard not to look back on the decade. Over two-thirds of my life, so far, was spent in the Aughts or the Naughts or the Naughties or the zeros or the 2000s or whatever the hell we're going to call them. I began the decade not even as a legal adult. Thus, my entire adult life, so far, and the most momentous events of my life occurred in that decade. I graduated from both high school and college, moved out of my parents house, lived several places, owned three cars, traveled to Mexico and all around the US, met some of the best friends I will ever have in this life, and fell in love with Kirsten. It's hard to top that last one. I think most people look back on their twenties as the best time in their life, and I probably won't be any different. This decade encompassed most of that age and even though on the whole, this decade probably does not rank terribly highly in American history, I will always recall it fondly.

What are my new goals, my New Year's and New Decade's Resolutions? My immediate New Years' Resolution is to become, by this time next year, proficient in reading French and Latin. I'm halfway there with the French, and I just started learning Latin over winter break so I'm kicking it into high gear. May 2010 be the year of languages! In terms of the decade, I suppose I have some personal goals and some professional ones. I certainly hope that, sometime between the age of 27 and 37, I get married and start a family. It would also be nice to own my own home as well, rather than continuing to rent from tiny apartments, though both of these, essentially, are contingent on my accomplishment of the professional goals. By the end of this decade, I would like to have completed my PhD in either history or the history and philosophy of science and be gainfully employed as a professor at a university. By the end of the decade, I also hope to have published at least one book. And if I have time, it might be nice to be the drummer in a band. Haven't done that in a while. So, there you have it. Ten years of goals and aspirations. Wish me luck. Ave atque vale!


Wednesday, January 6, 2010

A Semester's Worth of History


It's been a rather longer hiatus from bloggerdom than I thought it would be. I didn't post at all in December and haven't posted anything in nearly six weeks. I have no excuses, and perhaps worse than no excuses, I forewent my chance to really post some good ones since I had three weeks with literally nothing to do but eat turkey and stuffing, drink wine and wassail, and watch full seasons of LOST and Star Trek. Instead that's all I did, and though I read a few books I'd been wanting to get through before the new semester began, I also spent a lot of time sleeping till noon and and staying out at night drinking with friends. Poor me, eh? So, I've finished my first semester as a graduate student and am in the process of beginning my second. I thought I'd make my triumphant return to the world of internet posting with a little reflection on that process and what I hope the new year has in store for me in academia.

Firstly, while I haven't been particularly surprised by the workload, the amount of reading I've done over the past four months is pretty staggering. With only two classes, one of which was a graduate/undergraduate mix and thus less intense, plus thesis research (which I did little for, since I haven't even fully settled on a topic yet), the reading was still at a high level. I haven't counted specifically, but I think I read somewhere in the neighborhood of 15,000 pages of text over the course of the semester, totaling somewhere around twenty-five full books and significant portions of perhaps sixty to seventy others. The amount of writing I did was also rather high (higher than usual, from what I've been told), totaling at around 115 pages--two lengthy research papers, five shorter reading analyses, two non-research papers, and two finals. Still, I never felt particularly overwhelmed, and after I mastered the arts of skimming and picking precisely the most important passages of texts without reading them in their entirety, the voluminous content breezed by rather quickly. I also managed to avoid having any serious panic attacks, although the one all-nighter I pulled to finish a 15 page final paper I had not had a chance to work on until the night before it was due, left me gasping for breath somewhere around 3 AM as I had serious doubts I would meet the 10:30 AM deadline. Of course, it all worked out though.

What has this process been like and how has it changed my outlook on the idea of history? I think one of the biggest lessons I've learned thus far is the difference between the study and practice of history. Studying history tends to be easy: you absorb all of the information in front of you by reading and understanding the arguments presented by historians. The practice of history, however, is usually a lot more challenging. One must know the proper research paths to take, how to evaluate the sources (not to mention the necessity of studying language to broaden one's source base), how to recognize the various points of views the authors bring to the table, how to approach history from the theoretical frameworks of the day while never denying the actual information one must find to confirm one's own theories (this of course, does not always happen, which is why one should derive theories after the research). This is a contentious topic in history, as many historians have been accused (and rightly so) of simply searching for information that confirms their arguments. I think the biggest difference between studying history as an undergraduate and studying it as a graduate student is the amount of theory and criticism employed at this level. This seems obvious in retrospect, but it never dawned on me as an undergraduate that this aspect of historical study was missing from my education. As an undergraduate, for the most part, one studies history, in the words of the founder of the professional history, "wie es eigenlich gewessen ist" or "as it actually happened." That is not to say that controversy over interpretation is not acknowledged, but in general, professors lecture, students take notes as authoritative, and papers and tests are written and taken to prove that a certain level of knowledge has been achieved. Not so, graduate school.

Most of the classes we take are on the theory and philosophy of history, rather than on the accumulation of knowledge. It is essentially assumed that you will do that sort of legwork on your own, and when class time arrives, the goal is not to regurgitate these facts, but to argue your case based on the evidence you've amassed. While this may not seem like earth shattering information (and it's not), I do find it interesting that history seems to be one of the few disciplines that is taught this way. Theory and criticism are not at all a part of the undergraduate experience. To me, this is a bit like being a biology major and never being introduced to evolutionary theory, or studying philosophy without ever understanding what metaphysics or epistemology are. I also received a bachelor's degree in English, and after the first few introductory courses, the coursework became rather theoretical to some degree, or at least we were initiated into the vocabulary of the trade. I had two courses on literary criticism as an undergraduate. Courses are rarely even offered on historical criticism or historiography at the undergraduate level.

Shortly after entering the program, a second year graduate student, following an engaging discussion on how to be a historian, told me that "You will find out rather quickly what type of historian you are," by which he meant that the theories we accept and the theories we regard as bullshit will differentiate themselves rather early in our career. So far, I'm not entirely sure that I agree. Perhaps it's my moderate personality or my ability to find the positives and negatives in modes of discourse or perhaps I'm just wishy-washy, but I have not quite found any particular historical framework that I feel is either the theoretical approach to take, nor have I found any that I feel to be complete bunk. One recent trend in historical studies is, since the late 1970s and early 80s, postmodernism, which is extraordinarily difficult to define. As far as history is concerned, postmodern theory treats "truth" (and oftentimes fact as well) as entirely subjective and tends to view historical thinking and writing as more of a humanities study than a social science. In this ideational structure, literary criticism and linguistic theory inform history more than research into the past itself. Everything, as they say, is "text". While I believe that the vocabulary and rhetoric employed by postmodernism has enriched historical study, I think that the denial of factual information has done something of a disservice to the profession itself. One of my major problems with postmodernism has little to do with the more arcane and jargon-laden arguments set forth by the theoreticians and more to do with the imprecise definitions utilized by the field. I plan on writing a bit more on this later, but for now, suffice to say that, in my view, postmodernism contradicts itself by making a "truth claim" that "there is no truth" and by failing to understand the interplay between subjectivity and objectivity. Western thought in general, but postmodernist thought (and for that matter scientific, rationalist thought) in particular, regards subjectivity and objectivity as essentially binary or entirely separate from one another, rather than as a continuum, which I believe they are. That is to say, something is not either objective or subjective, but most forms of knowledge are somewhere along the continuum, and one can observe facts and make arguments that are more or less objective than other arguments. A denial of all objectivity (which many postmodernists do) is, to me, as illogical as denying all subjectivity as well. In any case, some postmodernists historians have an "anything goes" attitude, which celebrates bias, in a sense, by saying that since no one is really ever capable of true objectivity, we should embrace subjectivity. For my part, as a historian, I think it would be absurd to claim that we don't approach our subject with bias, but it would be equally absurd not to mitigate these tendencies and attempt to rely on evidence (and where it takes us, even if it takes us somewhere we do not wish to go) at all costs.

Finally, it's been an interesting experience working with undergraduates. I've had some contact with different levels of education via my two years as a substitute teacher in high school and middle school and my summer grading standardized test for the state of Kentucky. So far, the undergraduate experience has been less trying on my nerves but no less challenging intellectually. Obviously, in dealing with a higher level of student, one expects a higher degree of intelligence, writing ability, behavior, and so on. For the most part, this is true. As a teaching assistant, I haven't had any discipline problems with any students in my classes. I have to say though, that while many times students surprise me with their lack of certain basic sets of knowledge, most of them generally seem as competent in historical knowledge as I would expect the average college freshman to be. The class I TAed for had around 120 students, and their grades ended up following a pretty standard bell curve, though the apex of the parabola hovered around the low-B rather than the mid-C mark. Probably around a dozen students in the class were able to write sparkling essays in relatively polished prose that demonstrated a fair amount of knowledge, just as there were around a dozen students who believed that Italy was Sweden, the French Revolution occurred in the Early Middle Ages, and AIDS caused the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. And this is after listening to a semester's worth of lectures. Most students who can't handle it drop after the first few weeks but it's not uncommon for students who think that the Mediterranean Sea is named the "Sea of Calamity" to be there taking the final on the last day of class along with the history majors.

I look forward to my future semester. I have a class called Hermits and Heretics: The History of the Medieval Church, 300-1450, which looks promising, and I'm furthering my historiographical studies with both European and non-Western historiography as well as American historiography. Plus, I'll begin my thesis in earnest this semester through the prospectus course all first years must take in their second semester. I still don't know exactly what my thesis will be on, though it will almost certainly be on a late medieval or early modern history of science topic. Currently some ideas include looking at the evolution of the soul/body to mind/body dualism among natural philosophers from, say, Albertus Magnus to Rene Descartes. Another idea is to pick one country during a particular time period (or, after taking Hermits and Heretics, perhaps the Church) and look at its specific legal attitude towards astrology. I have a few others but haven't fleshed them out yet. I guess that's what the prospectus class is for. You can be sure, dear reader, that, like it or not, I'll probably be posting about it along the way. It's good to be back to the world of blogging and the world of academia.

Saturday, November 21, 2009

Salem in Social, Cultural, and Religious Context: An Analysis of The Devil's Dominion by Richard Godbeer


When the first colonists began to leave England for North America in the early seventeenth century, they carried a certain subset of beliefs and assumptions with them across the Atlantic which derived culturally from England and religiously from the Calvinist influenced doctrines of Puritanism. In his work The Devil’s Dominion: Magic and Religion in Early New England, Richard Godbeer examines the complex worldview of these early Puritan settlers and describes their mental and physical realities as far less homogeneous than is often explicated. Although the separation between the elites and the laity was a much smaller gap in Puritan New England than in Europe, many distinctions existed that provided context for their convoluted interpretations of magic, counter-magic, and witchcraft. Godbeer examines the origins of the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692 through the historical framework of late seventeenth century New England - specifically, the similarities and differences between European and colonial witchcraft beliefs; the impact of occult counter-magic and folk healing on the witchcraft trials; and the historical circumstances contributing to a cultural climate that allowed witchcraft trials to proliferate.

Throughout The Devil’s Dominion, Godbeer describes the nature of magic and occult phenomena, and embedded within this account is an inherent comparison of colonial beliefs and their European counterparts. Despite the distance across the Atlantic, the Puritan cultural and religious links with England were never completely severed during the seventeenth century. From 1620 to 1692, New England provides us with an excellent historical laboratory in which to observe both the continuity of witchcraft beliefs as they traveled from England to North America and the quintessentially Puritan version which arose organically amidst the political and religious turmoil of the last quarter of the seventeenth century. The most apparent similarity between Puritan and English witchcraft was the emphasis placed on the witches’ interaction with the devil. Indeed, this was the salient feature of most Protestant interpretations of the crime. Before the accused could be held responsible for the crime of witchcraft, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the witch had dealings with Satan (153-155). Also like Europe, this explanation of witchcraft as a diabolical heresy pertained primarily to the elite, and in New England the elite class was composed of clergymen.

This elite integration of the devil into the idea of witchcraft was itself an indefinite process. How did one even define the devil? As in Europe, the ministerial fixation on Satan did not exactly accord with the preoccupation with practical magic and counter-magic among the Puritan laity. Satan was not simply evil personified but could also be envisioned as a non-anthropomorphized force or power in the world, manifested most dangerously through the actions of people (87). This apperception of Satan extended to broader dimensions than just the context of witchcraft. For example, demonological rhetoric was employed to attack Native Americans, who represented the great heathen Other (192). The racial, religious, and cultural differences between Puritans and Native Americans were obviously vast, and these differences were often highlighted in ways that portrayed these Native Americans as diabolical. In the demonology of witchcraft, the devil often offered the accused wealth in exchange for her services, and any trade between settlers and Native Americans may have been interpreted in diabolical terms.

Enemies from within the Christian fold were not immune from this line of attack either. The odd piety of the Quakers, who shook uncontrollably as they prayed, easily lent credibility to the Puritan belief that they were possessed by the devil. Their behavior likely seemed little different from those who writhed in contortions under the supposed spell of the devil (194). When the assaults fell within the political sphere, the colonists were not averse to using diabolical language to denounce their enemies. The term “adversary,” for example, was applied to Edmund Andros, the wildly unpopular Anglican ruler of the short-lived Dominion of New England, which deferred, perhaps unconsciously, to the original etymology of the word “Satan” (187). Andros was later demonized alongside Native Americans, with whom he was accused of conspiring against the New Englanders (188). This language of diabolical association would later be applied toward witchcraft in Salem.

The social distance between the laity and the clergy was far smaller in New England than Europe, distinctions were far less entrenched, and interaction between them was more common. As Godbeer mentions, the family, the town meeting, and the church provided the cohesive structures that bound society together. The latter two furnished direct contact between elites and the laity (3). Given this more integrated social structure, why did such a brutal witch hunt occur in Salem in 1692? For one thing, women were excluded from the town meetings (4). The social solidarity that collective decision-making supplied to the male colonists not only may have rendered these women outsiders in their own communities but may also have removed any power they had over their own political and social destinies. The harshness and ruggedness of existence in colonial New England already ensured that women heavily participated in the communal work of a village, but the elite cultural and religious assumptions of female weakness exposed women to a paradoxical existence: they did not participate in the civic or political processes but were fully expected to ascribe to its rules (118). Beyond the level of household, women had social contact with men only in church, and Godbeer contends that their religious conviction left them vulnerable to spiritual crises such as those that rocked late seventeenth century New England (114). Godbeer also reports that seventy-nine percent of all witches and eighty-four percent of all demoniacs in New England were women (68 and 114). By many accounts, this was a greater preponderance than in Europe.

There were significant differences between European and New Englander cultures of magic, counter-magic and witchcraft. According to Godbeer, unlike Europe, folk healers seem to have been at greater risk of being accused of witchcraft in New England (66). Godbeer does not detail specific reasons for this difference, though it may have been due to the fact that no folk tradition of lay medical practitioners existed in New England. The line between magical and non-magical healing was a fine one, and practitioners of folk medicine were often either ignorant of the fact that their work was under suspicion or maintained that it was in no way diabolical (66-68). In any case, the ends may have justified the means in the arena of folk healing, and the merits of the medicine—whether a natural or supernatural antidote—seemed to hinge on its results. In New England there may have been a paradoxical increase in the Puritan use of magic and counter-magic due to the decline of the legal prosecution of witches from the early 1660s to the late 1680s. By taking spiritual matters into their own hands, these Puritans may have inadvertently created the very social conditions that condemned many of them for this use (177-8).

Pluralism, both religious and cultural, also produced different results in New England than in Europe. According to some scholars, pluralism led to greater tolerance in Europe, especially following the Peace of Westphalia, whereas pluralism disrupted the fragile existence to which Puritan New Englanders clung. After the Protestant Reformation began, Catholics and Protestants fought bitterly with one another in Europe, but after generations of living side-by-side, a mutual, if begrudging, respect emerged. Puritan settlers left England for North America, in part, because they desired religious freedom for themselves apart from other Christian sects. The presence of Native Americans, French Catholics to the north, Dutch to the south, and an influx of secular merchants and non-Congregationalist Protestants throughout the late seventeenth century upended their perceived homogeneous environment.

Though its themes come to a head with the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692, The Devil’s Dominion is more concerned with the cultural and political climate of New England in the decades leading up to this event. Godbeer is at his most erudite when synthesizing the cultural, political, and religious trends and explicating how they coalesced and contributed to the trials. Historically, he asserts that the years from the founding of Plymouth colony in 1620 to around 1675 were relatively peaceful. This peace was disrupted by a series of events that shattered the Puritan world. King Philip’s War (1675-6), a brutal conflict with the Wampanoag tribe and a following small-pox epidemic, decimated the New Englander population (182-3). During the next decade, the revocation of the Massachusetts Charter and imposition of the Anglican-controlled Dominion of New England (1686-9) eliminated self-rule among the Puritan colonies and for a short time returned them to the very political conditions they sought to escape in England (184). In 1690 hostilities with Native Americans renewed, this time with French support, and shortly thereafter, the new colony charter granted religious toleration to Anglicans, Quakers, and other Protestant denominations, breaking the Puritan monopoly on religious authority in New England. Richard Godbeer convincingly argues that these events, amidst the cultural climate I have detailed above, generated suitable conditions for the witchcraft trials at Salem to flourish.

The Salem witchcraft trials, though violent, were ephemeral compared to the sustained witch craze of early modern Europe. The trials reached very high up the social ladder into relatives of the very people prosecuting the cases and, unlike the more natural progression of events in Europe, the ministerial authorities made a conscious decision to halt the trials. The very act of uncovering a witch undermined the self-proclaimed godliness of these Puritan authorities because the methods for discovering a witch had much in common with the counter-magic for which the laity was accused—trial by water, hot iron, scalding water, or other ordeals (160-1). If supernatural knowledge was required to a investigate magic, it defeated the purpose of the trials in the first place and exposed the clergy to charges of hypocrisy (220-222). Like England, Puritan elites and commoners never came to a consensus regarding the nature of witchcraft, but unlike England, the common ideas were never truly assimilated into the legal process. Ministers seemed to be at a loss to interpret counter-magic as anything other than witchcraft. Godbeer’s sophisticated treatment of the events leading up to the Salem witch trials masterfully contextualizes the cultural, political, and religious circumstances of late seventeenth century New England and their bearings on Puritan ideas of witchcraft.

Friday, November 20, 2009

A Short Hiatus from Bloggerdom and Some Things to Come

I'm currently in the home stretch of my first semester as a graduate student in history, which, as you can imagine, is why I've been away from the blogging world over the past couple of weeks. In fact, not counting the revised papers on witchcraft I posted here, I haven't done much of anything original since late September. Obviously, I've got a lot to do, so I probably won't post again until the semester is over around the third week of December, but I thought I'd give a quick preview of some things I intend to get up here on the site before the end of 2009.

Firstly, I have several book reviews I've written over the past few months and a few from over a year ago that I would like to post. I don't really do book reviews too often, but it's something that academic historians do for shorter works in journals, so I'd like to get some up here. I recently read a really fascinating work for my witchcraft class called The Devil's Dominion, about the existence of magic and its integration into religion in Puritan New England in the seventeenth century. It really put he events in Salem in political, religious, and cultural context and really breaks down some stereotypes about not only the ultra-rigidity of Puritan religious beliefs but also the myth of the strict homogeneity of their colonies. I know, it's one more post on witchcraft, but since it has to do with Puritan New England, I can loosely tie it to Thanksgiving. I'll post it soon. Some other books, history (though most is not terribly current) and otherwise, that I'll review soon include a a biography of Alexander the Great, an examination of the military explanation for the fall of the Roman Empire, some of the works of Arnold Toynbee, a few works on the history of astrology and magic, as well as some Jungian stuff. Like many other things I post here, these will mostly be revised versions of things I have written for myself in the past.

Secondly, I have two pretty big papers coming up and once the semester is over and I've gotten back professor comments and made the necessary adjustments I'd like to post them here. The shorter paper I am writing compares Giordano Bruno and Domenico Scandella, two victims of the Inquisition in Italy in the late sixteenth century. By examining their respective cosmologies and heresies, I hope to draw some conclusions about the similarities and differences between elite and common conceptions of the cosmos at a time when a multitude of contradictory ideas proliferated. Scandella, a literate Friulian miller, was a man on the margins of society. He was exposed to cultural diversity and pluralism in his profession, benefited intellectually from the rise of the printed word, and performed an integral function within his peasant community though he was often alienated from it for his unorthodox ideas. Bruno was a peripatetic scholar who never resided in one location longer than a few years, and consequently, he was often a mistrusted figure in his adoptive lands. He advocated Hermetic and Neoplatonic philosophy, and his early acceptance of the Copernican heliocentric theory, though it had little to do with his eventual trial and execution, has earned him a place in the history of science. For these reasons, among others, both figures aroused the suspicions of the Inquisition. By positioning these two historical personages in the philosophical, religious, and socio-cultural settings of late sixteenth century Europe, I seek to better understand why their cosmologies were so offensive to the Church and why both were condemned for heresy. I also hope to submit this paper to a graduate student academic conference at North Carolina State. The longer paper is also a comparative paper, and I've written about the topic many other times, so I won't go into too much detail. In short, I'm comparing Andrew Dickson White - a late nineteenth century historian and president of Cornell University who wrote an extremely influential work on the history of science and theology, in which he argued that they have historically been enemies - with modern historian of science David C. Lindberg, who represents the modern school of thought that neither warfare nor harmony accurately depicts their relationship. Both these papers exemplify my general interests in history and I'll post them later in December.

Finally, I'm coming up on the one year anniversary of this bog's inaugural post, which is in the first week of January next year. This blog started, in part, due to the fact that I made it my new Year's Resolution at the end of 2008 to write more and I decided a blog would be the best testing ground for that commitment. I think the results have been pretty good though I am going to far well short of my one hundred post goal. I intend to write at least one post reflecting on my year of blogging and what I'd like to accomplish in the world of writing in the coming year. With my first semester of grad school almost behind me, I also want to write a bit on how that process has changed me, what I've learned, and how I have interpreted the lessons of graduate school. I don't necessarily want to write so much about history, but what higher education means to me and how this type of schooling is, in most ways, entirely different from all other education I've received up to now in my life. So, for the future, you can look forward (I hope) to some book reviews and some actual normal blog posts that have to do more with my life and less to do with my increasingly abstract thoughts. Enjoy!

Sunday, November 1, 2009

Skepticism, Science, and Superstition: The Decline of Witchcraft Trials in the Seventeenth Century


The height of the witch craze in Europe occurred between roughly 1560 and 1630, but the decline and eventual disappearance of witchcraft trials transpired in a much more disjointed fashion chronologically and geographically. Several historiographical explanations exist to account for this demise, and emergent cultural and intellectual trends throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries provide a context through which to understand these changes. The rise of the mechanistic world view of Descartes, Newton, and others posed a problem for witchcraft because prevailing natural interpretations of previously unexplainable events established a schema into which witchcraft could not easily be assimilated. Greater religious toleration and the acceptance of religious pluralism in many places allowed diverse beliefs to coexist within the same social milieu and thus fears of witchcraft diminished. However, it should also be noted that although the trials themselves ceased, a general belief in witchcraft, especially among commoners, did not. This points to a gradual shift of the import that the notion and term “witch” carried in popular consciousness. The category and terminology surrounding the idea of the witch lost a great deal of cultural cachet during the seventeenth century among the elites in charge of its prosecution and devolved into broader associations with superstition. I intend to critique four historians’ approaches to the problem of witch trial decline and the growing gap between the elite opinion regarding witchcraft “superstitions” and the commoner continuation of belief largely devoid of its legal implications.

In his analysis of the decline of witchcraft, Brian Levack asserts that new legal safeguards and procedures regarding the prosecution of witches accompanied the edification and centralization of the nation-state. In keeping with his overarching thesis that the centralization of authority actually contributed to a decrease in witch trails and helped to restrain more zealous local authorities, Levack argues that new legal protections beginning in the early seventeenth century made it more difficult for authorities to prosecute for witchcraft. He cites four major changes contributing to a decline of witch trials: greater judicial centralization, limited or forbidden use of torture, greater necessity of evidence for conviction, and better legal defense allocated to those accused of witchcraft. According to the new judicial world view, far fewer people were actually capable of being witches. Skepticism grew among elites, but at first this skepticism did not extend to a belief in the authenticity of witchcraft. Rather, it entailed judicially specific skepticism of the efficacy of torture to extract true confessions and to greater doubt concerning the adequacy of evidence presented in the majority of trials. Even while authorities in the early seventeenth century grew more skeptical of the presence of a vast conspiracy of witches, its reality as a crime remained.

This new skepticism was accompanied by a redefining of the term “witch” to narrow its meaning and grant it less power. Johann Weyer, for example, distinguished witchcraft from “magicians, evil-doers, enchanters, and poisoners” all of whom might be charged with witchcraft by less discerning prosecutors. He explained witchcraft as a natural phenomenon and, through textual exegesis and linguistic analysis, claimed that the Biblical witch from the heavily quoted Exodus 22:18 did not directly correlate to those accused of witchcraft in the early modern era. Similarly, John Webster argued over a century later that witches were better classified as “Deceivers, Cheaters, Counteners, and Imposters” and that natural explanations could be employed to explain the persistence of these beliefs. A greater emphasis on natural explanations to describe seemingly supernatural events coincided with this growing skepticism. During the seventeenth century, the intellectual outlook of European elites inclined toward more empirical, materialistic, and scientific visions of the universe, and this has historically been regarded a common justification for the decline of witchcraft trials. There are two problems with this approach. One is that, according to Levack, the rise of this world view came several decades after the worst of the witchcraft prosecutions had already subsided. The other is that, within the time frame of the decline, the “scientific” world view embraced far more natural philosophies than simply the materialistic. Neoplatonism, for example, still exerted a great deal of intellectual influence as late as the mid-seventeenth century, and it much more readily accommodated occult and esoteric ideas. Only the mechanistic weltanschauung would not incorporate witchcraft, and according to Levack, it had not yet ascended to prominence.

Levack acknowledges the problem of chronology and does not specify precisely when the trials came to an end, leaving a very broad time frame for decline—beginning in some places as early as 1600 and not in others until the 1670s. This implies not only that new scientific and philosophical ideas diffused at different rates in different regions but also that the abatement of the importance of witchcraft as a categorical notion depended largely on cultural factors in specific regions. In the case of England, for example, Marion Gibson contends that controversy surrounding particular witchcraft trials caused a hesitance to prosecute on the part of the judiciary. Gibson refers to J.A. Sharpe and recounts a more precise chronology than Levack, tracking skepticism via the decline of witchcraft pamphlets through the 1620s and 1630s. The Wonderfull Discoverie of Elizabeth Sawyer, published in 1621, was the last until 1643. However, Gibson claims that the reduction of pamphlets led to a decrease in witch trials though it seems just as likely that declining elite interest in witchcraft hastened the demise of the pamphlet. From the chronological information provided, the two appear to have ebbed simultaneously. In either case, witchcraft simply did not hold the cultural or judicial currency for prosecutors it once possessed.

Owen Davies answers some of Gibson’s lingering questions in his acknowledgment of the fact that witchcraft declined at different rates in different geographical areas for distinct reasons. For Davies, the growing cultural divides between rural and urban spaces most greatly affected long term witchcraft trends. Particularly, the lack of an agricultural lifestyle in urban settings and different levels of contact with livestock may have had an impact on the subsiding trials. Davies attests to the utilitarian nature of the peasant version of witchcraft, noting that nearly half of all witchcraft cases in rural Surrey involved livestock and humans as opposed to less than a third in the comparable urban setting of Southwark, implying that rural accusations still revolved around the hexing or cursing of animals. However, this seems to be a broad assumption because Davies never defines the degree to which urban environs differed from their rural counterparts before the Industrial Revolution. A complete dichotomization of rural and urban settings had not yet occurred in the seventeenth century, and it would not be until industrialization that a substantial divorce arose.

The more convincing aspect of Davies’ argument is his contention that the constant flux of people in and out of cities comprised the greatest difference between rural and urban landscapes: families lived for generations in rural peasant communities whereas cities had a higher turnover rate of inhabitants. This lack of communal cohesiveness made it far more difficult for the type of internal feuds that oftentimes typified witch hunts. The idea that witchcraft ran in families lacked cultural significance in cities where multigenerational contact and continuity was not often the norm.

Davies is also very careful to note, as Levack and Gibson imply, that the decline in witchcraft prosecution does not necessarily indicate an absence of witchcraft belief. He notes numerous accounts of common witchcraft belief throughout nineteenth century England and in France, in one particular incident, as late as 1968. Of course, by this time the trials had long since subsided, and these existed as folk explanations of unusual activities devoid of illicit meaning. This pertains to physical objects as well. Horseshoes, for example, once held specific significance for witchcraft deterrence, but later seem to have dissolved into general superstitious belief. By the time dangerous witchcraft beliefs came to be regarded as innocuous superstitions by the elites, witchcraft prosecutions waned. Later elite contempt for the explanatory power of witchcraft likely contributed to the Enlightenment view of witchcraft as a simple superstition since this was the most immediate and contemporary form of belief educated elites encountered among common people.

Given that the concern for witchcraft diminished in the legal sphere throughout the Enlightenment, why was there a continued acceptance of witchcraft among commoners? It is possible that we see a return to pre-trial era modes of discourse about witchcraft, and the meaning that this term carried may have reverted back to "illusions and phantasms." While it may not have contributed directly to the decline in witchcraft trials, the “disenchantment” of the world throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries almost certainly contributed to a decline in the acceptance of witchcraft among the educated elite. Among the commoners, Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra concurs with Davies and surmises that a more stable domestic life and a less precarious agricultural system affected witchcraft beliefs because misfortune no longer required a supernatural explanation. This was reserved for “personal” justification of events—beneficent experiences were attributed to God, whereas maleficent ones could still be blamed on witches. However, as the witch hunts decline, this had little bearing on “impersonal” explanations of the mechanistic, material universe.

In conclusion, it was largely the elite perception of witchcraft that underwent a substantial change throughout the seventeenth century. Peasant understanding of its nature continued as it had for generations while a growing skepticism, informed by new ways of thinking about the natural world, issued from elites. This change was gradual and not until science ceased to encompass occult ideas did a marked decline occur. In a sense, just as elites made the crime of witchcraft more serious in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, they also made it less serious throughout the mid to late seventeenth. The shifting zeitgeist of the time period is reflected in the morphing terminology used to define and describe witchcraft, in the greater legal protection afforded to the accused, in the waning of pamphlet publications in England, and in increasing distinctions between rural and urban life. For these reasons, among others, witchcraft trials decreased throughout the seventeenth century.